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Much of what is written about war, beyond the generally 
quite searing eyewitness recollections of the combatants themselves, consists of the 
official reports, carefully crafted analyses, histories, and memoirs of senior leaders 
that focus upon planning, operations, and the outcomes of the particular conflicts in 
question. The common themes that arise—across times and cultures—highlight the 
importance of valor, the subtle interplay of strategy and contingency and, most of 
all, the determinative factors of sheer numbers and superior 
technology. What is too seldom considered, though, with few 
exceptions, is the matter of the design for warfighting. By this 
term we mean not only the design of weaponry, but also the 
structure of military units, the concepts of operations for their 
use in battle, and the information systems that first sense the enemy’s composition and 
disposition of forces, then process and transmit this knowledge as a guide to action. 
Taken together these elements form the design for warfighting. 
The current era is one in which longstanding ideas about military affairs have come 
under strain. Weight of numbers and advanced weaponry have proved of little mo-
ment against supple networks of insurgents and terrorists. Indeed, the much vaunted 
“war on terror” has morphed into terror’s war on the world, as reflected in the roughly 
seven-fold increase in the yearly totals of terrorist attacks between 2001 and the pres-
ent. Another troubling development is that an increasing number of nation-states now 
see the value of cultivating relationships with illicit networks of nonstate actors, or are 
forming their own dark networks with which to conduct covert warfare. The strong 
connection between Iran and Hezbollah provides an example of the former, Russia’s 
“little green men” of the latter. In the face of such developments, the costly American-
led military interventions, manpower “surges,” and even the sophisticated use of 
highly advanced technologies have proved insufficient. Thus it seems that we live in 
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one of those revolutionary times when, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels put the mat-
ter in the first section of their Communist Manifesto, “all that is solid melts into air.” 
We offer an antidote to the Marxist prediction that the liberal, capitalist world system 
is sowing the seeds of its own destruction: we can design our way out of the problems 
that face us. In the realm of war especially. 
How can this be done? By recognizing that war is, in essence, a “design competition.” 
Whatever weapons are crafted, however military forces are structured, their information 
flows determined, and no matter the ways in which the use of these various elements 
in battle is pondered, all must come together in a manner that 
enables them to contend with and then prevail against the adver-
sary’s designs. Because the enemy is often quite familiar with the 
standard-use tools of war and well-worn, longstanding practices, 
design innovations very often come from “the outside” and aim at 
overthrowing conventional approaches to conflict. Of course, to each 
side the other is the enemy—which should serve as a spur to all to become innovative 
designers of war fighting capabilities. 
Sometimes the warfare design competition has been one-sided, with the combatant who 
enjoys seemingly substantial advantages often suffering from complacency. This was the 
case in many of the efforts to tamp down the anti-colonial insurgencies that flared up in 
the wake of World War II, culminating in the general collapse of overseas empires—their 
echoes still sounding as the American design for war failed to avert the fall of South 
Vietnam in 1975. The following decade saw the Russians defeated in Afghanistan in 
a similar manner. And in all the years since 9/11, the advanced militaries of many 
countries have failed to curtail the highly networked global terrorist insurgency under 
way. The key insight to be drawn from all these troubles is that weight of firepower 
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and even the most advanced, precise weapons systems can be deftly thwarted—even 
defeated outright—by skillful designs for warfighting. 
It is with this thought in mind that we offer herein a brief introduction to the concept of 
design in war, along with some observations about the way to employ design as a dis-
tinct paradigm that integrates technology, information flows, force structure and battle 
doctrine. Weaving these elements together in creative ways is, we believe, the key to 
winning the design competitions that undergird and define all wars. In what follows, 
we begin by sketching the concept of the design for warfighting, which is one part, 
perhaps the central part of a larger phenomenon of “strategic design” — which is itself 
a key component of the even broader, and more familiar, notion of “grand strategy.” 
For now, we feel it is enough to examine how design sensibilities form a key aspect of 
warfighting approaches. 
After introducing the elements that comprise the design for warfighting, we explore in 
some historical vignettes, and in one detailed case study, whether there might be some 
identifiable favoring conditions that tend to undergird victory—and conversely, “dis-
favoring conditions” that are the harbingers of defeat. The central insights to watch for 
Bulgarians ambush and kill the governor 
of Thessalonica, Duke Gregory Taronites.
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have to do with the relationship a combatant has with “standard practices”—ranging 
from slavish devotion to a kind of strategic free-spiritedness—and with the notion of 
“alignment” of the elements of design. Our vignette drawn from ancient history, for ex-
ample, finds that the Roman military stayed too attached to the infantry-heavy legion-
ary formation, while the Byzantines shifted to greater reliance on cavalry, informed and 
guided—needless to say, well aligned with—an optical telegraph system that created a 
network of coverage impressive even by today’s standards. Our medieval and modern 
vignettes, from the Hussites to Wilhelmine Germany, echo these themes about the will-
ingness to depart from the standard practices of the day—the Hussites did, the Kaiser’s 
top naval advisers did not—and the need to align the design elements skillfully. As to 
our analysis of Vietnam from a design perspective, we believe that this approach brings 
fresh insight to that much-studied conflict. 
This monograph should be viewed as a first step on the path to seeing design as a 
distinct paradigm for thinking about and analyzing military and security affairs—
different from algorithm-based quantitative study, as well as from empirically-oriented 
cultural/historical analyses. The next step will be to move beyond a focus on designs 
for warfighting to explore the broader level of strategic design and its relationship with 
grand strategy. In an era of seeming perpetual warfare, in which the United States and 
its allies have incurred massive costs for all too small returns, the design paradigm of-
fers fresh hope that we may indeed prove able to meet and master the range of vexing 
challenges that darken and bedevil our world. 
We are deeply grateful to our colleagues across campus here at the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School who have embraced notions of design and incorporated this approach 
THIS MONOGRAPH IS A FIRST STEP TO SEEING DESIGN AS A PARADIGM 
FOR THINKING ABOUT & ANALYZING MILITARY AND SECURITY AFFAIRS
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in their teaching and research. General Ray Odierno (USA, ret.) deserves much credit 
for encouraging us to launch our inaugural study about how to redesign the Army. 
Equal credit goes to the range of American and International graduate students who 
have employed “the design approach” in major projects ranging from study of the 
strategic challenges posed by a warming, much-disputed arctic zone to the various 
ways in which special operations forces might be called upon to operate in the future in 
an increasingly restive East Asia. These endeavors, and others, have helped to foster a 
growing awareness of the power of the design paradigm. We hope that this monograph 
will prove to be yet another contribution that helps sharpen the awareness of design 






Soldiers from B Company, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 10th 
Mountain Division, await orders to move out on a nighttime patrol.




war is Many things. in the age of tools, a griM shoving-
match of phalanx and legion. With the coming of machines, a mechanized engine 
of mass attrition. On all occasions a time portal reflecting both the strong pull of the 
past and the possible future face of battle. The Great War a century ago, for example, 
featured both the tight-packed infantry formations of previous centuries and the 
submarines, tanks, and attack aircraft that foretold the future of conflict. The former 
reflected traditional military belief in the pre-eminence of mass; the latter demonstrated 
a growing faith in and reliance upon technology to solve operational problems. In the 
century since the Great War, quite often to the detriment of strategic thinking and direc-
tion about the kinds of forces, unit structures, doctrine, and the role of information, 
faith in the power of sheer numbers and advanced weapons—the 
fundamental tenets of “military science”—have dominated the 
discourse. And sadly so since, for our part, all of these factors are 
necessary in the design of warfare. 
Failure to include any of the above factors increases the risk of 
ruin in war. For surely there is a need to craft the best weapons 
and field enough forces. But developing the right types of units, 
acquiring information and distributing it effectively, then identifying the best-suited 
fighting doctrines are crucially important to a well-formed design. Granted, each of 
these factors is familiar, taken one by one. But from our perspective, rarely have they 
been well aligned to best effect in war. And alignment of these factors into an inte-
grated and mutually supportive whole forms the core of the concept of design. During 
the Great War, doctrinal innovation lagged far behind the logistical capability to deliver 
massive forces to the field and remained farther behind the technical ability to deliver 
accurate, deadly firepower. The result of such a serious misalignment: years of mind-
less slaughter that killed millions. 
WAR REFLECTS BOTH 
THE STRONG PULL OF 
THE PAST AND THE 




There have been many other examples of misalignments in warfare designs. In 1940, 
the French military had sufficient numbers of troops and weapons that were advanced 
enough (for that era) to defend the nation; but they were very poorly aligned with 
fighting unit structures. France was conquered in weeks. A generation later in Vietnam, 
American air supremacy, firebases, and “big units” fell afoul of oppo-
nents’ doctrinal innovations whose alignment of virtually all their war-
fighting factors was near perfect—and so the superpower was defeated. 
In the ongoing “global war on terror,” an epochal struggle between 
nations and networks, nations have failed for the most part to shift their 
warfare designs from notions of mass-on-mass confrontation to a focus on finding hid-
den foes. In this war, as in so many others, the informational dimension has proved key. 
Whether arising from disputes over territory, god-concepts or economic systems, war 
is a design challenge. For superior numbers, and even the most advanced technologies 
have all too often been overcome by well aligned innovative doctrines, ingenious fight-
ing unit formations, and “information advantages.” Integration of all of these factors—
numbers, weapons, doctrines, structures, and information—is essential for effective 
war-fighting capabilities. Their skillful blending has separated victors from vanquished 
for millennia, and has shaped the course of human history. 
But there is more to design than just considerations that focus on war-fighting. Peace, 
too, is a design challenge. Ancient Athens and Sparta learned this the hard way after 
more than a decade of conflict, when the troubled Peace of Nicias unraveled and the 
tragic Peloponnesian War dragged on for another decade. The Carthaginians, who 
fought so long and hard against Rome, foolishly agreed to a peace designed around 
their own unilateral disarmament. Their city was soon razed, the survivors sold into 
slavery. In more modern times, the retributive Treaty of Versailles in 1919 so poorly 
designed the peace that even the victors saw it as little more than a “twenty-year truce.” 
When Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich in 1938 with a scrap of paper that he 
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said represented “peace in our time,” he was holding an exceptionally flawed design. 
War returned the next year—right on the timeline of the critics of Versailles.1 The Unit-
ed States had its very own Chamberlain moment in 1973, when Richard Nixon acceded 
to a design that he called “peace with honor” in Vietnam. Two years later the North 
Vietnamese Army headed south. Saigon fell. Ambrose Bierce was right, in his Devil’s 
Dictionary, when he defined war as “a byproduct of the arts of peace.” Yes, designing 
peace matters, too. A great deal.
Clearly, issues of war and peace are among nations’ highest concerns. Yet for all the 
attention given to military affairs, we find far too little evidence of or focus upon 
design. Instead, sheer material factors have tended to be emphasized. For example, 
the Powell Doctrine of “overwhelming force” ruled over American national security 
strategy for decades, 
despite clear evidence 
that adherence to it ran 
up extravagant costs, 
proved quite insuf-
ficient to ensure the 
vital interests of the 
country, and damaged 
the image of the United 
States in the world 
community. The Powell 
Doctrine only recently 
has given way to what 
may come to be called 
an Obama Doctrine 
featuring a more subtle 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain upon his 
return to London on September 30, 1938.
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warfighting design based on small, special military forces working closely with allies 
and indigenous fighters.2 
Designs of warfare and peace are central to successful outcomes, but they are not the 
only factors we must consider. Effective designs need to be embedded in larger, more 
comprehensive strategic designs that knit together the various elements of statecraft 
and military affairs in service to broad national aims. Beyond narrow considerations in 
the realm of military affairs, which focus on gaining a clear sense of the current—and 
possible future—technology of war and associated unit structures 
and fighting doctrines, we need to link our designs for war and 
peace to the “context of conflict” where civil authority, diplomacy, 
and other political factors come into play. The envisioned post-
conflict environment is key here. So much so that, as the strategist 
B.H. Liddell Hart once put the matter: “Victory in the true sense 
implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than be-
fore.”3 It should be understood that, whatever might happen in battle, or even at the 
conference table, all must be carefully aligned with the public’s opinions—domestic 
and international, to varying degrees. 
It is interesting to note that our foregoing design framework tracks fairly closely the 
famous “trinity” of which the eminent philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote. 
He advanced the argument that the careful combination of military professionalism, 
political acumen and, as he formulated it, “passions of the people” formed the founda-
tions of national power, as well as the basis for any realistic hope of achieving victory 
in war. Indeed, for Clausewitz these three elements had to be joined in an optimal—yet 
admittedly unstable—mixture that, as he put the matter, “maintains a balance between 
these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”4 
While this study focuses on design factors associated with the first element of Clause-
witz’s trinity—military matters—the other legs of his triad are important as well. For 
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in the high politics of statecraft, allies are generally very good to have; and in domestic 
politics the support of the people matters quite a bit as well. But without a competent 
military, a country, even one with very reliable allies and a steadfast public, faces 
defeat. Thus our principal focus in this overview is on those warfare design factors—
technological, doctrinal, structural, and informational—that shape military affairs and 
determine war outcomes.
Even our narrow focus on the design of war poses daunting challenges, for each of the 
factors we have delineated is complex; any effort to align them greatly increases the 
complexity of the task. That said, there are conceptual “handholds” that allow us to 
attempt to scale such a height. In the realm of technology, for example, the age-old link-
age between weapons range and accuracy continues to be the sine qua non of success 
in battle. The key today is—and no doubt will continue to be the case tomorrow, too—
that sensory and guidance systems make it very likely that weapons can substantially 
increase their range and still enjoy great accuracy. Indeed, if there is a distinct advance 
in weaponry wrought by the ongoing information revolution, it is as Colin McInnes 
described the matter early on: “With precision terminal guidance, accuracy is no longer a 
function of range. If a target can be ‘seen,’ visually or electronically, then it can probably 
be hit.”5 
In terms of military doctrine, there really are just a few dominant themes to keep in 
mind. The first has to do with the interplay between an emphasis on mass and the 
resort to maneuver. The abovementioned Great War was a classic case of overemphasis 
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on mass at a time when the destructive power of weapons routinely defeated offen-
sives that relied upon sheer weight of numbers. Late in that war, however, efforts to 
maneuver arose, particularly in the form of the Allied forces’ mobile tank units and 
the German Stosstruppen. Each effort had quite profound implications for military 
unit structures. For the tanks to be effective they should have been concentrated in 
a given area to break through the front, then to fan out beyond the opening. For the 
small groups of storm troops, the structural implication was to have many small units, 
widely dispersed.
Neither of these attempts to shift to maneuver warfare succeeded in ending the 
stalemate on the Western Front. Tanks were employed too early and were too widely 
dispersed when their numbers were few; and so the Germans had time to concentrate 
artillery against them.6 Despite these limitations, the potential was clear, and just a 
generation later in World War II armored maneuver swiftly came to dominate the face 
of land battle. With regard to the German effort to achieve a maneuver capability by 
means of redesigning their infantry units into small squads whose goal was to find or 
create, then infiltrate small gaps in the enemy line, the initial results were astonishingly 
An early German tracked-vehicle design 
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successful in the March 1918 “Michael” offensive—which very nearly won the war. 
Disaster only befell them when their commander, General Erich Ludendorff, strayed 
from his own stated emphasis on finding and exploiting gaps. Instead, he became too 
focused on the capture of Arras, and reverted to the old way of relying on mass. As 
Correlli Barnett described the disaster that soon ensued, soldiers in “[w]ave after wave, 
in some places shoulder to shoulder six lines deep, advanced through a pouring rain, in 
full view of their enemies, and were decimated.”7 All hope of victory was lost that day. 
The second major theme in military doctrinal and related unit design has to do with the 
division between conventional and irregular warfare. This doctrinal dualism can be 
seen from earliest times. Roman legions had to fight many traditionally massed oppos-
ing armies in their day; but they also found themselves deeply embroiled in a guer-
rilla war in North Africa against Jugurtha late in 
the Second Century B.C.E., then two centuries later 
against the Judaean Sicarii (“dagger men”) who pre-
figured what we call terrorist networks today. And 
in almost all the centuries since, war-fighting has 
featured both conventional and irregular doctrines. Most of the time, the conventional 
approaches have been dominant—thus massed forces and firepower have always been 
much-sought-after commodities. But over the past seventy-plus years since the end of 
World War II, insurgency and other forms of irregular war, including terrorism—have 
diffused widely. In these conflicts, the preferred unit structures have been small and 
supple, like the German storm troops. 
The last major element in the design of war that we will examine closely in this mono-
graph is informational—a broad multidimensional concept when it comes to pondering 
the design of war-fighting capability. For our purposes, the components of the infor-
mational dimension fall into categories that encompass sensing and communicating. 
Each of these component areas should be examined from both offensive and defensive 
CONVENTIONAL AND IRREGULAR 
WARFARE REQUIRE DIFFERENT 
DOCTRINAL AND UNIT DESIGNS
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perspectives. For example, while it is important that a “sensory system”—which can be 
comprised of technological gadgets and people—has the capacity to keep an eye on the 
opponent’s forces, it is just as crucial to be able to prevent the adversary from detecting 
and tracking one’s own dispositions and movements. In terms of the signals systems 
that form the backbone of communications, they should be fast, secure, accurate—and 
tightly coupled with sensors. Another aspect of communications is the challenge to 
maintain the morale of one’s own fighting forces while undermining the opponent’s—
and at the most appropriate moment, exploiting enemy cognitive and motivated biases 
with skillful deceptions. 
In the following sections we shall explore some 
historical examples of competing designs with the 
abovementioned factors in mind. Our hope is that 
this sort of preliminary analysis will give the reader a 
solid sense of how to think about warfare design, and 
what patterns, if any, might be associated with suc-
cess—or failure. More importantly, as our reexamination of the Vietnam case illustrates, 
not only do we have to align our technological, doctrinal, structural, and informational 
design factors but we also need to craft our warfare designs in light of our adversaries’ 
designs. In design competitions, adversaries always get a ‘vote’ on the most effective 
design. 
Given our unique depiction of war as a “design challenge,” we believe it is particularly 
appropriate to explore this concept with an equally unique (to military affairs, at least) 
framework for analysis. Thus, in the last section, we depict warfare design as the 
centerpiece of a large, complex, adaptive defense system that supports and resources 
it. Although our primary focus is on the design of war that guides combat operations, 
we acknowledge that it is necessary and useful to understand how warfare design is 
embedded in larger system designs at the organizational and strategic levels. 
SIGNALS SYSTEMS SHOULD BE FAST, 





1. The classic study of the unraveling of the interwar 
period’s design for peace is Edward Hallett Carr’s 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: 
Harper Perennial, [1939]1964).
2. See especially Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doc-
trine,” in The Atlantic (April 2016) on the doctrine’s 
broad, statecraft-oriented themes. For specifics on 
military design elements, see John Arquilla, “An 
Obama Doctrine?” The San Francisco Chronicle, 
January 31, 2016. 
3. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1954), p. 370. Fred Iklé, Every War 
Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 
revised edition 2005) offers a profound meditation 
on the design of peace—and perhaps even the 
redesign of the notion of “victory.”
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translat-
ed by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.
5. Colin McInnes, “Technology and Modern War-
fare,” in J. Baylis and N.J. Rengger, eds., Dilemmas 
of World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 
p. 148.
6. The best account of tank operations during World 
War I is still J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 
1914-1918 (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 
1920). Fuller had developed a well-articulated 
armored doctrine at the time, one that combined 
maneuver and concentrated units skillfully; but his 
ideas were over-ruled in favor of a much less in-
novative approach—one that achieved much less. 
7. Correlli Barnett, 1918: Gamble for Victory (New 
York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 66.
John Steinbeck once wrote, “All war is a symptom of man’s failure as a thinking ani-
mal.” This is no doubt true to some degree—perhaps to a great degree—about the onset 
of war. But once at war, there can be no excuse for a failure to think deeply or fight 
wisely. Our hope is that the concept of warfare design may not only inform and guide 
effective action in wartime, but it may also offer redesigns at the organizational and 




II. Warfighting Design Vignettes
a Major strand of strategic thought has always eMphasized 
the tools of war as primus inter pares. Major General J.F.C. Fuller, who was the first great 
advocate of tanks a century ago, even went so far as to state: “Tools, or weapons, if only 
the right ones can be discovered, form ninety-nine percent of victory.”1 But the use of 
armor during the latter part of World War I was of little moment, as key issues about 
force structure and doctrine had yet to be resolved.2 Debates about these matters raged 
during the 1920s and 1930s. In retrospect—and to some extent as early as the fall of 
France in 1940—it became quite clear that what worked in terms of unit structure was 
concentrating tanks in purpose-built armored (that is, panzer) divisions rather than 
simply parceling them out equally across the force. 
Ironically, French General Charles de Gaulle 
made one of the earliest and most eloquent 
cases in favor of such a war-fighting design,3 
but his radical suggestions strayed too far from 
the preferred standard practice of the time and 
were rejected. The Germans, as is so well known, were more willing to depart from 
standard practices, built panzer divisions, then swiftly outdueled a larger (and better) 
French tank force, inflicting upon the Third Republic what one very perceptive histo-
rian labeled its “strange defeat.”4
With regard to the doctrinal dimension during this period, the most incisive thinking 
was done by another British strategist, B.H. Liddell Hart, who came up with a concept 
of operations, “the indirect approach,” that neatly aligned the technology of the time 
with the preferred force structure in a way that allowed and soon empowered military 
maneuvers of a sweep and on a scale hitherto unseen in the history of warfare. Liddell 
Hart’s basic idea was to avoid the typical slugging matches featuring massed forces in 
THERE IS A SUBTLE INTERPLAY OF 
TECHNOLOGY, FORCE STRUCTURE, 
DOCTRINE, AND INFORMATION FLOWS.
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favor of wide, sweeping movements primarily aimed at disrupting the entire enemy 
system by striking deeply at unexpected points, often where both administrative and 
logistical centers were located. His major survey of the history of warfare drew him 
to one key conclusion: “throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been 
attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s 
unreadiness to meet it.”5 
This doctrinal concept lay at the 
heart of the German blitzkrieg suc-
cesses from 1939–1942. Beyond the 
fall of France in 1940, it must be 
noted that the invading panzers, 
just in the initial invasion period 
in Russia, from June to December 
1941, inflicted losses of five million 
troops on the Red Army. Most of 
these losses took the form of prison-
ers captured in large “cauldrons” 
created by the indirect approach 
of the German armor. Cut off from 
their higher commands and logisti-
cal supports, these millions of troops 
had little choice but to surrender 
en masse—though a tiny minority 
did sometimes fight their way out, 
or retreat to the forests to act as 
partisans. Interestingly the German 
successes during this period were 




Russians had more and better gunned and armored tanks—to a far greater extent than 
those the French had put in the field the prior year.
The well-known history of armored operations as they emerged late in World War I 
and blossomed in World War II is very useful for exemplary purposes in highlight-
ing issues regarding the subtle interplay of technology, force structure, doctrine and 
information flows. The importance of these four elements being well aligned with 
each other can hardly be overstated. 
Witness the French debacle in 1940 
when their excellent, numerous 
tanks had neither the correct struc-
tural form nor the right doctrine for 
their employment—which also can 
be said of the Russians in 1941. But 
their omissions in these areas would 
not have been fully exploitable 
had the Germans not developed an 
information system that encouraged 
lateral communications within and 
among their tank formations—and, 
literally, vertical radio links with 
attack aircraft providing “flying artil-
lery” close support from above. Nei-
ther the French nor the Russians had 
similar information systems—which 
cost them dearly. Still, those familiar 
with World War II will recall that, 
from late in 1942—counting from the 
big battles that led to Russian victory 
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at Stalingrad and British triumph at El Alamein—the blitzkrieg had become a blunted 
sword. 
How? Why? The simplest, best answer to these questions is that the Russians in the 
East—and the British in the North African campaign—had finally become willing to 
give up on standard practices and began to organize, fight, and communicate like the 
Germans. With both sides using such methods, attrition began to assert itself again—
but there were still remarkable, deep thrusts in the blitzkrieg style, now mounted by 
skillful generals like the Russian Zhukov and the American Patton. Yet it took a will-
ingness to depart from standard practices to make their winning campaigns possible. 
With the four factors of warfare design (technological, doctrinal, structural, and infor-
mational) in mind, this section uses historical vignettes to illustrate examples of good 
and poor warfare designs. We begin with consideration of three paired vignettes drawn 
from different eras, each providing insights into what makes for design success—or 
failure. The first explores the differing design solutions the Roman and Byzantine 
Empires developed in response to external pressure from barbarian peoples. The 
second, drawn from the Hussite Wars that arose in the late Middle Ages, examines a 
bitter struggle between aristocratic forces of armored knights following centuries-old 
standard military practices, and a peasant “rabble” that had an appetite for embracing 
innovative designs. Our third paired vignette explores the design dimensions of the 
Anglo-German naval rivalry in the two decades prior to the outbreak of World War I. 
THIS SECTION USES HISTORICAL VIGNETTES TO  




One of history’s more fascinating military puzzles has to do with why the Byzantines 
outlasted the fall of Rome by a thousand years. At the time Diocletian divided the 
Empire in half in 285 C.E., it seemed clear that the legions of the West (i.e., Rome) had 
retained far more of the traditions and staying power of their military ancestors. And 
over the course of the next century, this conclusion seemed ever more clearly borne out. 
As historian Arther Ferrill has observed, “it was primarily the eastern armies that had 
suffered the great defeats in Persia (363) and at Adrianople (378) … The simple fact is 
that the western army was better.”6 As to the leading line of argument, about the in-
creasing numbers of uncontrollable “barbarians” who were 
recruited into the legions, took them over, and eventually 
brought down the Empire, Ferrill notes that this was only 
true in the case of Rome, despite the fact that the Byzantine 
armed forces “had been much more barbarized than the 
army of the West.”7 Thus, with a weaker army and many more barbarians in the 
East, one would have expected to see disaster engulf Constantinople long before 
the end in Rome. That the opposite result unfolded suggests that other important 
factors were afoot.
We find it useful to contemplate this puzzle from a design perspective. At the internal 
level, both the eastern and western imperial militaries arose from the same infantry-
heavy legionary roots in terms of structure and doctrine. Both also shared the external 
concern that barbarian peoples—Huns, Goths, Germans, Avars, Bulgars and Vandals, 
among others—were putting sharp pressure on the edges of empire. These hostile 
forces tended to field more cavalry and relied to a much greater extent on missile 
weaponry than did the legions. In terms of their strategies, both the East and West 
began this period (the late Third Century C.E.) with the inherited goal of holding on to 
virtually all of imperial territory by preventing penetration of the frontiers. The notion 
WHY DID THE BYZANTINES 
OUTLAST THE FALL OF ROME 
BY A THOUSAND YEARS?
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of “preclusive security” made sense given that, as noted strategist Edward Luttwak 
observed, the Empire “did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed group of enemies, 
whose ultimate defeat would ensure permanent security … the frontiers would always 
remain under attack.”8 
Eventually, though, domestic manpower pools diminished, making it ever harder to 
station troops in sufficient numbers at all the imperial frontiers, and the sheer cost of 
maintaining such a force structure became too great. Thus a major shift in strategy, 
from perimeter protection to defense-in-depth emerged. Early in the Fourth Century, 
Emperor Constantine reduced the number of forces on the frontiers to the point of their 
simply being able to provide early warning of invasions and to hold on to fortified 
outposts. The idea being that smaller numbers of troops were 
to be assembled into larger bodies of mobile legions, stationed 
well in from the frontiers, but at sites that would enable them to 
respond quickly to threats wherever they might arise, at many 
varied points. The key to success, it was thought, was an infor-
mation system that could consistently raise a timely alert. 
Another challenge for the defense-in-depth concept was to achieve speed of legionary 
movement, so that the damage done by invaders could be limited. Roman infantry, 
known more for their deliberate pace of advance—and for building fortified camps 
at the end of each day’s march—simply could not improve upon their speed without 
some change that lightened the load of the average legionary. Emperor Gratian gave 
much thought to the problem, and believed that he had found a solution: if the infantry 
simply discarded their body armor, sharply reducing the amount of weight they car-
ried—with ever greater reluctance—the legions could then move to trouble spots much 
more swiftly. True enough, the Romans now moved at a pace that allowed them to 
engage invading forces before they penetrated the imperium too deeply. The problem 
was that, in the effort to improve speed, the fighting power of the legions was fatally 
THE GOTHS, THE HUNS, 
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compromised. For the barbarian enemies, so often defeated in the past by Roman 
steadiness in close-quarters combat, could now loose their arrows with greatly damag-
ing effect into the tightly packed, unarmored imperial formations. 
Edward Gibbon, in his classic History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, put the 
matter succinctly: “the Goths, the Huns and the Alani … excelled in the management 
of missile weapons. They easily overwhelmed the naked and trembling legions.”9 This, 
Gibbon argued, was the proximate cause of Rome’s fall.10 In our words, this was a 
design flaw that arose out of the reasonable desire to improve mobility that went awry 
because of the unintended consequence of making the legions easy targets of highly mo-
bile barbarian horse archers. In the East, perhaps because of the difficult time and poor 
results the longstanding standard legionary practices were having in the field, there was 
a much greater willingness to experiment with new force structure and doctrine. 
Re-enactors in Roman legionary battle dress
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Faced with the same external threat—literally, “barbarians at the gates”—and with 
similar manpower strains internally, the Byzantines also shifted from preclusive fron-
tier protection to a defense-in-depth design. But they did so with an important twist. 
Instead of trying to figure out how to keep the infantry structure of the legions and 
increase their rapidity of movement, the Byzantines changed the very character of their 
army by making it much more a cavalry-centric force. And in addition to now having 
units that could swiftly move to trouble spots, the Byzantine cavalry arm introduced 
two new concepts: the armoring of the horse and man; and the equipping of each caval-
ryman with a mix of missile weapons—javelins, composite bows and darts—as well as 
various close-quarters combat capabilities (especially short stabbing lances, maces, and 
swords). 
Defensive armor and the multiplicity of weapons opened up the possibility of intro-
ducing innovative tactical concepts of operations as well. Instead of the long-standing 
Roman cavalry practices of hurling a javelin, or charging just for shock effect, then 
fighting at close quarters, the Byzantine cavalry emphasized use of successive charges 
in waves, unleashing missile weapons each time. Military historian Martin van Creveld 
desribed the operations of these cataphracts as “horse archers employing their typical 
hit and run ‘swarming’ tactics.”11 This proved a highly effective design that thwarted 
barbarian incursions in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries—and was exceptionally useful 
in the Seventh Century and after against highly mobile Muslim field forces. The goal 
being, as the Emperor Nikephoros argued in his classic De Velitatione (Skirmishing), 
to raid, trap, and ambush enemy forces, keeping always on the move. As Edward 
Luttwak has summed this concept up, it operated “with a deterrent purpose: instead 
of trying to preclude incursions—much too hard to do—enemy columns [were] to be 
trapped.”12 It was a system that worked well, for centuries. 
As in the West, imperial defense-in-depth strategy in the East was highly dependent 
upon a swift, reliable information system that could accurately detect and continue 
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to track enemy movements—virtually in what is today called “real-time.” The Byzan-
tines created such a system with an optical telegraph as their primary piece of “critical 
information infrastructure.” It worked for many centuries. Medieval historian J.B. Bury 
noted that “the signal service introduced, or 
perfected, under Justinian [in the 500s], was 
carried so far that a Saracen raid in the Taurus, 
four hundred miles straight away, could be 
signaled almost at once to Constantinople by a 
series of beacon fires.”13 Needless to say, swift 
and accurate communications were necessary for the Byzantine system to work—but 
the forces in the field still had to have a concept of operations that gave good chances of 
prevailing once battle was joined. 
However, it must be noted also that the durability of the Byzantine Empire was not 
solely the result of cavalry-related innovations in structure and doctrine, or the sup-
porting, lightning-speed information system. Aside from the triple walls that secured 
Constantinople—at least until siege artillery had become strong enough to batter them 
down in the 15th Century—there was a great deal of creative design in eastern naval  
affairs as well. Ship speed was of crucial importance, so the Byzantine dromon (“run-
ner”) emerged. 
Instead of following the classic Roman concept of ramming and boarding—so as to 
have an infantry fight at sea—the Byzantines emphasized firepower. At first this was 
defined in terms of archery, at which the Byzantines drilled their squadrons to act 
in concert with over-lapping fields of fire. Later on, they introduced “Greek Fire,” 
an incendiary weapon shot from metal tubes, and which was used both by ships at 
sea and shot from towers in the defense of the capital as well. Greek Fire could not be 
extinguished by water. For centuries the sleek dromons and this most advanced weap-
onry dominated the seas. How very different from the Roman navy, which kept to its 
THE KEY TO BYZANTINE SUCCESS 
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old ways and twice was made to suffer humiliating defeats at the hands (and oars) of 
the Vandals.14 
In sum, Byzantine success was largely due to the willingness to develop and embrace 
designs that completely overturned longstanding unit structures and operational prac-
tices. These innovations were greatly empowered by an outstanding, reliable informa-
tion system. In some respects, the different fates of the two empires offer an almost 
laboratory-like test of the power of warfare design. Our second vignette varies from 
this first case to a degree in that, instead of looking at two clearly distinct responses to 
similar external threats, we next consider a situation in which a dominant military—
largely aristocratic—steeped in long-accepted and quite standard structures and prac-
tices—was challenged by a mostly peasant army that had little more than its wits, raw 
courage, and a blind general who was nevertheless a strategic visionary. 
Byzantine dromons repel Russian raiders in 941 C.E.
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The Hussites: Triumph and Tragedy
In 1517 Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-Five Theses to the church door at Wittenberg 
Castle, the opening shot of the Protestant Reformation. But over a century earlier, the 
Czech churchman Jan Hus had, as Luther would later, protested the sale of indulgences 
and other pecuniary practices of the Church that he held to be unseemly, if not outright 
corrupt. Hus developed quite a following among the Czech people, causing much con-
cern in Rome. Thus he was invited to a “council”—with guarantees as to his personal 
safety—to discuss Church reform. Hus arrived to find that there was little interest in 
reform, and far more in his incarceration. Soon after he was burned at the stake. But the 
spark he had ignited spread, supported for the most 
part by peasants. To extinguish what was becoming 
a full-blown Hussite movement—driven by calls for 
religious reform, and increasingly by rising Czech 
nationalism as well—the Pope launched a “crusade” 
against them in 1419. 
At first blush, it seemed likely that Hussite infantry, 
many lightly armed with scythes, flails, and other 
light weapons crafted from farm implements, would 
be quickly crushed by a holy army of mounted 
knights. But a minor Czech nobleman who was sym-
pathetic to the Hussite beliefs and nationalist cause, 
one Jan Ziska, chose to help the peasants fight against 
the flower of Christian knighthood. Ziska, a man 
already in his sixties, had fought against the Teutonic 
Knights in the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, and be-
came deeply interested in the emerging technologies 
of “hand cannons” and larger pieces of artillery. As 
The Hussite War Wagon
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he readied the Hussites for action against the crusading army of knights, he scraped 
together the resources—largely by raiding Catholic monasteries of their treasures—to 
acquire some of these new weapons, then skillfully blended them with what the peasant 
farmers all had: wagons. 
The wagon-fort concept itself—fighting defensively from the protection of circled 
wagons, in modern times a trope of film Westerns—was not new, having been used for 
centuries by nomadic steppe peoples, whose methods were then imitated by the Rus-
sians. Even farther back there are references to wagon-forts.15 But Ziska took matters to 
a whole new level. He built up the wagon sides, and notched loopholes for firing cross-
bows and handguns. Artillery came along with the Hussites as well, 
and was posted between their wagons. All moved at speed, com-
pared to the typical army of the time. The historian Lynn Montross 
put the matter thus: “The Hussite wagon-fort bore little resemblance 
to its crude military ancestor. It might more accurately be described 
as an armored car.”16 That is, the wagons gave the Hussite forces a 
degree of overall mobility to go with their firepower and protec-
tion that rival forces simply could not match—moving as the latter did at the pace of 
their infantry. Ziska also had the idea of using the wagon-forts offensively—at least 
strategically. He would drive his wagon-fort train very close to a crusader camp, halt, 
line up the wagons abreast and start bombarding the enemy, whose only choices were 
to attack or give ground. Needless to say the crusaders generally chose to attack, and 
were slaughtered—much as French knights were being decimated by English longbow-
men at the same time over in Western Europe.
When the crusaders tried to attack Hussite forces in flank, they found that Ziska had 
drilled his men to circle their wagons quickly on the defensive, and chain them togeth-
er so that the knights could not separate them and penetrate within. Given the Hussite 








provided by their wagon-forts, the challenge for 
the crusaders—drawn in large numbers from 
knights all over Europe—was to engage the Hus-
sites more closely. In pursuit of this goal, crusad-
ing forces were first increased in number, the idea 
being that enough attackers would be able to get 
through the Hussite curtain of fire to overrun the 
wagon-forts. Firepower prevailed, however, and 
the Hussites, never more than 25,000 in the field, 
routinely defeated larger forces—on one occasion 
an army five times their size. 
Next up was a solution aimed at making the knights’ armor heavier, so much so that it 
could now protect against arrows and bolts. Ziska’s response was simple and effective; 
he increased the proportion of handguns, reducing the number of archers and cross-
bowmen. Slaughter of the crusaders continued. And when, finally, the choice was made 
to build wagon-forts to fight against them, it turned out, unsurprisingly, that the Hus-
sites maneuvered them more skillfully and still won. The crusades were given up, but 
at that point the Hussites sadly turned on each other in a bloody civil war that erupted 
over niggling theological differences—like something out of Jonathan Swift’s descrip-
tion of the origins of the war between Lilliput and Blefuscu, or Dr. Seuss’s Butter Battle 
Book. Thus skilled wagon-fighters were going at it on each side—and soon brought a 
suicidal end to their remarkable movement.
It is important to note that one of the greatest strengths of the Hussites was their favor-
able asymmetry of motivation. Their narrative was simple: they were fighting against 
a corrupt Church and overbearing imperial control. It was a compelling story, one that 
galvanized virtually all Czechs. Against this, the crusaders—often dragooned into ser-




the wagon-forts. They had not the stomach for the kind of hard fighting that lay ahead. 
Yet it must also be noted that the zeal that enlivened and empowered the Hussites in 
battle, when turned inward against rival factions, wrought bloody disaster. 
Interestingly, the French at this very time were grappling with the same problem of 
how to come to close quarters with the deadly English archers who had decimated 
them at Crécy and Agincourt, two major battlefields of the Hundred Years’ War. They, 
too, strove to improve the armor of their knights, to little effect. What turned the tide 
Jeanne d’Arc
against the English was the vision of a teenage 
girl, Jeanne d’Arc, who claimed that “voices” gave 
her instructions on how to defeat the invaders: 
swift movement from march to assault on the 
English before they could properly set up the 
angled stakes that were there to protect their 
longbowmen. The answer was not to become 
heavier, but rather quicker, mounting, as Edouard 
Perroy put it, “surprises, sudden attacks, and 
deep raids.”17 It proved to be the first part of a 
war-winning answer—in later years the French 
also embraced field artillery. 
Whatever the source of Jeanne’s visualizations, spiritual insight, or however else one 
might characterize them, she played a key role in overturning the longstanding French 
military practice of marching, massing, then launching a long-anticipated frontal assault. 
The old ways simply allowed the English too much time to set up a line of anti-cavalry 
stakes in front of longbowmen, who then just kept firing away until the attackers had 
been decimated. The genius of Jeanne d’Arc was in her emphasis on striking before the 
English had time to set up—which put having information about their movements and 
dispositions at a premium. 
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The matter of visualization is no doubt a key element in the warfare design process. To 
return to Jan Ziska, he had lost one eye earlier in his military career; an arrow wound 
took the other at the outset of the Hussite Wars. Yet he continued in command, blind 
but still a true prodigy of warfare design, fully endowed with visualization skills suf-
ficient to meet and master the succeeding waves of crusaders.18 As the great historian 
Hans Delbrück once observed, Ziska pioneered an “effective and unprecedented method 
that aroused the amazement of all his contemporaries.”19 And though Ziska died 
midway through the Hussite Wars, his methods survived and his successors continued 
to win signal victories against the flower of Christian knighthood. The key to Hussite 
success: a willingness to reject the leading military doctrinal practices of the time, while 
hearkening to an old wagon-fort structural concept and revitalizing it with the most 
modern advances in weaponry. These elements, coupled with religious and nationalist 
zeal, gave the Hussites a warfare design far superior to that of the Crusaders who op-
posed them. Indeed, only Hussites could defeat Hussites. 
As to the early stirring of Czech patriotism, this can and should be seen as a harbinger 
of the “nation in arms” notion that arose to energize the wars of the Napoleonic era. 
Clausewitz considered this factor so important that he made “the passions of the peo-
ple “ a key element of his famous trinity of war. But he also cautioned that “[n]o matter 
how brave a people is, how warlike its traditions, how great its hatred for the enemy, 
how favorable the ground on which it fights: the fact remains that a national uprising 
cannot maintain itself where the atmosphere is too full of danger.”20 The wagon-fort 
design’s genius was in giving the Hussites a real sense of security in battle—or at least 
a sense that the atmosphere was not “too full of danger.” 
THE KEY TO HUSSITE SUCCESS WAS A WILLINGNESS TO REJECT THE 
LEADING MILITARY DOCTRINAL PRACTICES OF THE TIME.
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The Great Anglo-German Naval Arms Race
The ability to visualize proved to be a central factor that served to inform and guide 
warfare design in our third vignette as well, which covers the remarkable naval arms 
race between Britain and Germany that unfolded in the quarter century between 1890 
and 1914. It pitted the world’s long-standing leading navy against a fleet that was 
being built from scratch by a continental rather than a maritime rival. This race was 
conducted against the backdrop of fast-moving technological advances and growing 
geopolitical tensions that contributed to the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. 
Britain’s Royal Navy pursued a strategy based on the notion of sustaining its command 
of the sea to blockade its enemies, ensure the safe passage of friendly maritime com-
merce along trade routes, and to safeguard the ferrying of the British Expeditionary 
Force onto the Continent at the outset and throughout the course of any war. 
The strategy of the German High Sea Fleet was more complex and, to some degree, con-
fusing and contradictory. Although the principal rationale for fleet-building was to have 
sufficient naval combat capability to deter Britain from joining a Continental conflict, 
the very fact that Germany was pursuing such deadly sea power fed an Anglo-German 
SMS Scharnhorst The Battle of Jutland
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antagonism that only increased the likelihood that Britain would be on the enemy side 
in wartime.21 Given that the Germans began the naval arms race well behind the Royal 
Navy, as long as the British kept building warships the High Sea Fleet could never catch 
up. This dynamic led to a situation that resulted in, as Paul Kennedy has put it, “Ger-
many never improving its strategic position but so alarming her rival that many Britons 
increasingly identified the new Reich as their most formidable single foe.”22
Aside from pursuing an effective deterrent—an aim never achieved, given early British 
entry into the war—the Germans felt the need for a swift 
naval force that packed a fairly heavy punch in battle. 
There was vague hope that elements of the High Sea 
Fleet could help defend German colonies in East, West, 
and Southwest Africa, along with far-flung holdings a 
hemisphere away, ranging from Tsingtao in China to the Solomon Islands and other 
holdings in the Pacific. Thus a Kreuzergeschwader (cruiser squadron) was created, 
with most of its warships based in the Far East. But these forces spurred a British 
response—and caused a reaction in Japan as well—negating the value of the squadron. 
So there was very little hope that these cruisers could receive reinforcements in 
GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY WAS 
COMPLEX, CONFUSING, AND 
CONTRADICTORY.
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wartime, and fuel—coal in this case—and all other logistical supports were vulnerable 
to disruption. This was a problem for the lone raiders that the Germans also sent out to 
harry British and other enemy trade. 
As matters unfolded, Admiral von Spee, commander of the cruiser squadron, fled from 
the Pacific quickly at the war’s outset. He defeated a weak British squadron at Coronel 
off the Chilean coast, but his own force was wiped out at the battle of the Falklands in 
December 1914.23 As to lone raiders, most were dealt with quickly—in large part due 
to radio reporting of their positions. Historian Paul Halpern summed the matter up: 
“Modern technology … had made the conduct of cruiser warfare much more difficult. 
The presence of a raider could be quickly signaled by wireless.”24 
In terms of other aspects of the technological state of play in naval affairs during the 
decade prior to World War I, there were improvements in engine power, the range and 
accuracy of guns, and clarity of wireless transmissions. The 
German naval effort, led for twenty years by Admiral Al-
fred von Tirpitz and supported enthusiastically by Kaiser 
and legislature, was well attuned to the increasing potency 
of big guns. Tirpitz inferred that his “dreadnoughts,” 
would engage the enemy at long range. This meant shell-
fire would follow extended arcs, then plunge onto decks, so Tirpitz made sure to armor 
the decks heavily—not just the sides—of his ships. The British didn’t do this as well, 
and so suffered mightily for it at the Battle of Jutland in 1916, in which the Royal Navy 
lost fourteen ships and six thousand sailors killed. The German losses were eleven 
ships and less than half the number of sailors.25 
On the surface (no pun), the results of Jutland seem to bear out the success of the 
Germans’ design of their naval warfighting capability. But Jutland failed to change the 
overall strategic situation. The Royal Navy’s blockade remained, and the Grand Fleet’s 
INCREMENTAL CHANGE DOES 




greater size meant that it could absorb the losses of Jutland and remain ready to fight 
again. Indeed, Admiral John Jellicoe, immediately upon his return to port after the 
battle, signaled to the First Sea Lord that his ships “were ready to steam at four hours’ 
notice.” In military historian John Keegan’s assessment, the High Sea Fleet suffered 
big enough losses that “the German battle line could not have met the British at four 
weeks’, let alone four hours’ notice.”26 As the naval war unfolded, the Germans never 
again challenged the British battle fleet, remaining in port for the next two years. In the 
last months of the war, German sailors mutinied. 
The Royal Navy survived the German challenge because Admiral Tirpitz chose to 
build a fleet that, for the most part, simply mirrored its rival. And the incremental 
changes he did emphasize—protection from plunging fire, better optics, and improved 
German U-boat and crew, c. 1915
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compartmentalization—could not make up for British superiority in numbers. Nor 
could the High Sea Fleet serve as an effective deterrent, largely for the same reason: 
its smaller size. Thus the Germans failed because of their emphasis on imitating the 
standard practices of the leading navy of the day—though on a smaller scale, and with 
just a handful of improvements around the edges of naval design. Whereas, in our 
previous vignettes, the Byzantines and Hussites succeeded by virtue of their willing-
ness to jettison standard practices in favor of radical changes that saw them embrace 
highly innovative concepts of 
operations. 
Was there a more innovative 
design path open to Tirpitz? 
He was certainly aware of the 
rapid advances being made in 
submarine technologies. But 
in his Memoirs Tirpitz took the 
position that the limited range 
of these stealthy vessels kept 
him from championing them. 
As he put the matter, “I refused 
to throw away money on sub-
marines so long as they could 
only cruise in home waters, and 
therefore be of no use to us.”27 
But he was being a bit disingen-
uous here, given that he was in 
a position to accelerate the pace 
of technological advance. 
U-boat attack on an armed merchantman
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In fact, the German firm Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg was the world leader in die-
sel engine design—a decade before the start of World War I. Still, as Bernard Brodie noted, it 
was “only about a year before the outbreak … that Germany acquired her first real ocean-
going boats.” By the second year of the war, the Germans had only forty-one subma-
rines.28 As the U-boat war unfolded, even with these limited numbers, the Germans very 
nearly strangled British maritime traffic, sinking over thirteen million tons of shipping.
THE CLEAREST LESSON FOR WARFARE DESIGN IS THE NEED TO BE 
WILLING TO JETTISON STANDARD PRACTICES 
Why were the U-boats so successful? In part 
because, at the doctrinal level, the British were 
reluctant to adopt the escorted convoy system—
they waited three years. Convoys often took weeks 
or longer to assemble, and once underway moved 
at the pace of the slowest ship, a far more time-
consuming process than the standard practice 
of allowing the independent sailing of merchant 
ships. But in addition to British dithering over 
naval doctrine for protecting ocean commerce, 
there was also the technological problem that no 
reliable way of detecting a submerged vessel was 
developed until quite late in the war. A primitive 
form of sonar, the asdic, did eventually emerge, 
though it was of limited range, and its effective 





Thus U-boats enjoyed a significant informational advantage over their foes: they could 
observe without being seen, and unmask their presence only very briefly during an at-
tack—often a torpedo’s wake being the only sign—then return to hiding. Had Admiral 
Tirpitz and his minions thought more about the “sensing aspect” of the informational 
factor in design for war-fighting, they might have focused on submarine development—
the radical, innovative path—rather than on imitating the dreadnoughts of the Royal 
Navy. If they had done so, the outcome of the war at sea, and perhaps as a consequence 
the outcome on land as well, could have been different. But, as Bernard Brodie noted, 
Tirpitz “stubbornly opposed the adoption of the submarine … The Germans them-
selves never realized the tremendous potentialities of the submarine until the war was 
well under way.”29 Too late. 
Two Quick Insights from the Vignettes
The clearest lesson for warfare designs to be drawn from the vignettes is the need to 
be willing to jettison standard military or naval practices. The Byzantines and Hussites 
succeeded because they were quite willing to throw out an existing playbook. The Ger-
mans failed because they followed one too closely in naval affairs. Another interesting 
point has to do with the informational dimensional, which played out differently across 
each vignette, but which was important in each. The Byzantine optical telegraph was 
the key to their defense-in-depth system. For the Hussites, the power of their puritan 
and nationalist narrative drove them to keep fighting—and keep winning—against all 
odds. And German naval efforts could have succeeded if only the stealthiness of the 
U-boats had been properly appreciated.
But as much as designs for war-fighting depend on how a particular actor’s own 
warfare design aligns the technological, doctrinal, structural and informational factors, 
success—or failure—will ultimately depend upon how well or poorly an opponent 
aligns these factors. How the clash of competing designs plays out is the subject of the 
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III.  Vietnam: War as a “Design Competition”
perhaps the Most vexing of all aMerica’s wars, the long 
conflict in Vietnam tore down much of the edifice of strategic thought that the U.S. 
military had built up in the decades after World War II. At the level of force structure, 
the preferred “big units” with their heavy firepower proved too balky to deal with 
elusive guerrillas. In terms of technology, very advanced aircraft and extensive aerial 
bombardment, even with the Air Force’s increasingly smart targeting and guidance 
systems, failed to stem the tide of North Vietnamese troops and supplies—or to break 
the will to fight of enemy leaders or their mass public. With regard to military doctrine, 
early emphasis on a Special Forces-led counter-insurgency campaign soon gave way to 
the massive application of General William Westmoreland’s admittedly innovative new 
concept of “air assault”—an approach reliant on rotary aircraft to deliver troops to the 
battle. But the helicopter proved highly vulnerable to ground fire, a problem worsened 
by the small number and predictability of good landing zones in the difficult terrain of 
Vietnam. So much so that more than 4,000 choppers were shot down during the course 
of the conflict.1 
If the war was long and wearying for the U.S. military and the American public, it was 
even more demanding upon the Vietnamese insurgents. First, during the fight against 
French colonial rule, they were called the Viet Minh. Later, post-partition in 1954, the 
guerrillas in the South were labeled the Viet Cong, distinguishing them from the more 
regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA). For both of them, the decade-long “American 
War” that followed on the heels of the long fight for independence from the French 
proved to be the ultimate test of their resolve—and way of war. Success against the 




French was gained by a blending of doctrinal concepts: Mao Zedong’s ideas about 
guerrilla warfare and Napoleon Bonaparte’s notions of independent yet convergent 
maneuvers by larger forces. And in the campaign at Dien Bien Phu sheer grit made the 
difference, with thousands of insurgents lugging heavy artillery high up the seemingly 
unscalable heights overlooking the French positions. The effect was devastating—and 
war-winning.2 
But the struggle against the Americans was going to call for much greater effort, and 
a warfare design that could hold up under sustained air attack while at the same time 
engaging a modern military that enjoyed extensive advantages in firepower and tacti-
cal mobility. To confront this challenge, Vo Nguyen Giap, a high school history teacher 
turned general, came up with a set of concepts 
that marked him as one of the “great captains” 
of modern times. For during the course of the 
conflict from the arrival of the first major U.S. 
Marine detachments in 1965 to the fall of Saigon 
ten years later, he and his soldiers first held off, 
then compelled the withdrawal, of the top-line 
troops of the world’s leading military. 
To this day, just how Giap and the North Viet-
namese achieved their victory remains one of 
military history’s most challenging puzzles. The 
American argument that insufficient resources 
were employed is rebutted easily by noting the 
sheer size of the U.S. forces deployed—over half 
a million soldiers at the high point—and the 
fact that more bomb tonnage was dropped on 
North Vietnam than on Nazi Germany during 
Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh, 1939
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World War II.3 Another line of reasoning has to do with the notion that field operations 
went well from a warfare design perspective, but the American public could not bear 
its consequences—the heavy, growing casualties—so it ceased to support the military 
intervention. This argument is in large part contradicted by polls taken of the public 
during the national election surveys of the critical years 1966, 1968, and 1970. In each 
of the surveys, when asked whether to leave Vietnam, keep the current level of opera-
tions, or escalate the war, a significant majority of Americans indicated support for 
continuing the fight—or fighting even harder. Indeed, as many as 10% of Americans 
wanted either to invade the North or to use nuclear weapons.4
In our view, the American defeat in Vietnam—
and the North Vietnamese victory—can be more 
persuasively and accurately explained by ex-
amining the conflict from a design perspective. 
Analysis of the competing sides’ doctrines, force 
structures, technologies, and information strategies will shed light from new angles on 
this most perplexing war. And, we hope, make the case for the importance of thinking in 
terms of warfare design.
The Genius of Giap
Perhaps the highest praise of Vo Nguyen Giap has come from Russell Weigley one of 
the leading American military historians of the modern—or any other—era. As Weigley 
viewed Vietnam, it was a conflict in which the doctrine employed by the insurgents 
contributed heavily to their victory. He focused on Giap’s skillful blending of conven-
tional and irregular operations in the field, and drew a parallel with the Revolution, a 
time when Americans were insurgents. Weigley summed up Giap’s generalship as “not 
unworthy of comparison” with Nathanael Greene, who in his view stood “alone as an 
American master developing a strategy of unconventional war.”5
HOW GIAP AND NORTH VIETNAM WON 




For Giap, as for Greene before him, the challenge of waging a war both in occasion-
ally conventional and more often irregular fashion had much to do with arriving at 
the right force structure. Nathanael Greene was blessed by the presence of several 
first-class guerrilla fighters in the Southern colonies who kept the British distracted 
enough to allow him to advance with a main force and give open battle from time to 
time. Giap, on the other hand, had first to build the Viet Cong force structure of small, 
interconnected units all over the South and supply them, along with the regular North 
Vietnamese Army, with enough resources to allow them to take the field, harass the 
enemy and, occasionally, mount larger-scale offensives. 
The two-fold doctrine he developed worked reasonably well dur-
ing the first years of the “American war,” from 1965–1967; but in 
the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive the Viet Cong were decimated. 
As one account put it, “the indigenous Viet Cong—who did most 
of the fighting and dying—suffered a grievous military setback.”6 
At this point, Giap necessarily had to split off significant portions 
of NVA to continue hit-and-run guerrilla operations, and he shied from arguing for 
yet another attempt at major conventional battle until 1972, when U.S. ground troops 
were almost all gone and the South Vietnamese Army had to stand virtually on its 
own—but still with American air support, which proved crucial to defeating the NVA 
once more. 
In the end, there was no climactic confrontation with American troops, as there 
had been at Dien Bien Phu against the French. Instead, Giap’s forces kept up the 
fight for long enough to wear down the will of American senior leadership—if 
not of the American people. And in the spring of 1975 his forces, now under the tacti-
cal command of one of his protégés, launched a massive, blitzkrieg-like attack that very 
quickly overwhelmed the South.7  
AMERICAN DEFEAT IN 
VIETNAM CAN BEST 




Giap’s ability to stay in the fight—and we say “Giap” deliberately, for he often stood 
alone while others in leadership criticized him in front of Ho Chi Minh8—was not just a 
function of the sort of blended doctrine and mixed force structure that he championed. 
These elements of his warfare design would have failed in the face of the overwhelm-
ing air power of the Americans, the advanced weapons they possessed, and the mobility 
of their ground forces. Somehow Giap had to find a way to use technology the insur-
gents had at hand or could acquire, and also figure out how to employ low-tech means 
to counter these American advantages in the tools of war. 
To deal with aerial bombing, Giap early on, before the American war began, advocated 
going underground—literally. So factories in the North were relocated to subterranean 
settings from their centralized locations in Hanoi and Haiphong. As to the average 
soldier’s preparation, 
Giap lengthened initial 
training periods so that 
skill at building under-
ground outposts could 
be developed. Even the 
foxhole became more 
complex, as NVA were 
trained to dig deeper, 
then put in a turn at 
the bottom where the 
soldier scurried when 
under artillery or aerial 
bombardment. The turn 
at the end of the foxhole 





shells that exploded overhead—and from all but direct hits. North Vietnam received 
fighter aircraft and anti-air missiles during the war, largely from Russia, which sup-
plied many other war materials as well. American air superiority was not broken, but 
its effects were very much mitigated—by digging.
The underground theme was pursued extensively all over the South, where VC and 
NVA regularly operated from subterranean bases that soon came to include even such 
vital functions as hospitals. Indeed, the South became honeycombed by tunnels and 
underground facilities that helped to mitigate the effects of American bombardment ca-
pabilities and allowed insurgents to keep the initiative by remaining hidden until they 
chose to mount attacks. A very significant effort was made to counter this underground 
design, and an American military specialty of “rat holing” emerged. But there were just 
never enough “tunnel rats” produced to deal with the problem.9  
Even so, the extensive VC and NVA operations in the South would have withered had 
the North been unable to keep them supplied. This was a key low-tech task, central 
to the overall success of Giap’s warfare design, for which digging was obviously not 
a solution. Instead, a very resilient supply system had to be created that could stand 
up under American bombing. At the outset of the war, one idea was to take advantage 
of South Vietnam’s long coastline to smuggle in supplies, arms, and men to guerrilla 
units. But American naval forces responded quickly, blanketing the southern coast and 
rivers. Under operational names like “Market Time” and SEALORDS, this supply route 
was sharply curtailed.10 
Clearly, the challenge Giap had to master was to sustain the flow of supplies by land. 
He chose to build upon the “strategic supply route” that had been in development and 
lighter use from Viet Minh days—but which had its true origins in centuries-old trade 
footpaths that wound through the Annamite Mountains, which range roughly north-
south for over six hundred miles along the Laotian-Vietnamese border. The Americans 
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quickly identified activity along this route and dubbed it “the Ho Chi Minh Trail.” It 
wasn’t long before the Trail became a priority target for aerial bombardment. Air at-
tack was augmented by sabotage and occasional raids mounted by Hmong, Meo, and 
Montagnard tribesmen friendly to the Saigon regime—and with the American Special 
Forces teams advising them. But it was bombing that posed the most serious threat, 
and required the most robust solution.
Giap’s response was simple. Early on, he relied primarily on manpower to move sup-
plies, the size of each “packet” determined by what any individual could handle. But 
the big idea employed was not to have the porters simply carry their loads. Instead, 
they draped as much rations and ammunition as possible on a bicycle frame, and then 
pushed it. Given that a bicycle could support over 300 lbs., and that this was a weight 
that a porter could push steadily, it was possible to move massive amounts of supplies, 
bit by bit, to the forces fighting in the South. Later on, 
small trucks became the primary means of moving 
supplies—and some troops—on an expanding network 
of dirt-and-gravel paths. The “trail” was actually many 
north-south roads that stretched for hundreds of miles, 
initially in a design about twenty miles wide. Later in 
the war, the network’s width expanded to nearly ninety 
miles. 
An official American study has described the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail as “one of the great achievements of military 
engineering of the 20th century.”11 It was a very robust 
system, too. When American bombers came and killed 
porters or blew up trucks, cratering the Trail, the porters 
and trucks were replaced and the Trail was patched, 
with its alternative routes being used during repairs. Moving supplies along the Trail
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Throughout the length of the war, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was 
never seriously disrupted—a triumph of simple, resilient 
design. 
To cope with the massive edge American forces and the Army of the Republic of Viet-
nam enjoyed in firepower at the tactical level—a system supported by a network of 
artillery firebases augmented by fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships—the key 
was to retain the initiative so as to be able to choose when and where to fight. This 
meant keeping insurgent forces concealed for as long as possible, engaging at points 
outside the range of the firebases, and breaking off action before close-support aircraft 
arrived to strike at them. It was an approach that worked because the Americans never 
developed an information system that could regularly locate enemy formations. At 
least not to advantage, as the method employed—sending platoons of infantry into the 
jungle to “make contact” resulted in countless ambushes, playing neatly into the North 
Vietnamese design.    
Against Giap’s design for conquest, South Vietnam fought hard, and often well, as did 
small contingents from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thai-
land. But it was the Americans who bore the primary burden of thinking through how to 
use the technological edge they enjoyed to best advantage, what kind of force posture to 
adopt, and the appropriate battle doctrine to employ. In the end, the challenge of finding 
the right warfare design for saving South Vietnam proved just beyond reach.
Design of the “American War”    
If the Vietnam War can be described as a “design competition” between the main 
combatants,’ it also must be noted that, on the part of the Americans, there was much 
competition and rivalry within their own military and policy circles. President John F. 
Kennedy was very attached to the Special Forces—an almost “romantic attachment,” 
THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL 




as Eliot Cohen has put it, that saw JFK directly involved in equipping them, even 
securing their right to wear green berets. He hoped that just over a thousand of them, 
sprinkled about in small teams, could advise, train, and assist the indigenous troops to 
a point where they could keep South Vietnam safe from Northern conquest.12 By 1965, it 
was clear that this approach could not stem the tide of aggression, so the Air Force and 
Marines joined the fray. Strategically, air power was employed against the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail and targets in the North. Tactically, close support was given to heliborne ground 
troops. But in addition to General Westmoreland’s air assault concept, something akin 
to the Green Berets’ advisory approach was also being tried by the Marines.
Where Westmoreland relied upon a concept of operations made famous by his laconic 
expression, “mobility plus firepower equals attrition,”13 the Marines were willing to 
try out a very different approach to securing the coastal zones of South Vietnam. They 
did of course engage in some air assaults, as in the successful heliborne troop inser-
tion at Chu Lai, where some 700 Vietcong were killed in action, with Marine losses at 
under fifty. But the Marines also developed a design for security based on placing just a 
squad—a dozen or so men—in a village, its job being to work with Popular Force local 
militia to shore up security.14 The “Combined Action Program” (CAP) that emerged 
enjoyed naval gunfire support, on-call attack aircraft, and quick-response heliborne 
reinforcements. It was a wildly successful warfare design that swiftly, sharply reduced 
Vietcong influence. In the words of the Marine commander, General Lewis W. Walt: “Of 
all our innovations in Vietnam none was as successful, as lasting in effect, or as useful 
for the future as the Combined Action Program.”15 
GENERAL WESTMORELAND OVER-RELIED ON HIS BELIEF THAT “MOBILITY 
PLUS FIREPOWER EQUALS ATTRITION”
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Sadly, CAP’s days were numbered—and not by enemy action.  
For all its successes, and usefulness as a broader model for the conduct of the war, 
CAP displeased many senior U.S. military leaders. Westmoreland—and his political 
overseers—grew increasingly impatient with such a slow, defense-oriented approach. 
CAP, in their eyes, produced simply too low a “body count.” And so a “second act” 
unfolded, beginning in 1966, with the shift to a “big-unit war” aimed at taking a more 
offensive-minded approach that would, it was hoped, bring the war to a much swifter 
conclusion. This coincided with stepped up strategic bombing, both of the North and 
of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But since the enemy continued to control the initiative at 
the tactical level—that is, Vietcong and NVA decided when and where they wanted to 
fight—and Hanoi had long prepared to persist even under intense strategic bombard-
ment, neither element of the new American approach was to prove effective. 
Thus a concept of operations that was working was replaced with one that, it was soon 
apparent, was not. The shift away from the CAP paradigm had been undertaken with 
the idea of forcing the enemy to engage more directly, playing into the hands of supe-
rior American firepower. The enemy was not so obliging, continuing to pick and choose 
his battles—in which Viet Cong and NVA suffered higher losses than South Vietnamese 
“Westy’s” way of war
and U.S. forces, but inflicted enough 
damage to raise costs and create doubt 
at the very highest political level—that 
of President Lyndon Baines Johnson. 
Cannily, Hanoi at this time held out 
the prospect of a negotiated peace, and 
talks began in Paris that would go on 
for years. And even though LBJ became 
rattled by the lackluster results of the 
“mobility-plus-firepower” design and 
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frustrated by the slow progress of peace talks, he argued against further escalation of 
the war effort, telling his advisors “I am sensitive about doing anything that might 
hinder the negotiations.” This despite the fact that he knew “Hanoi was merely using 
the sessions for propaganda purposes.”16 In the end, LBJ chose to step down from the 
presidency rather than run for re-election. 
His successor, Richard Nixon, had several ideas for pursuing an endgame in Vietnam 
that were fresh, but also redolent of the earlier approach to the war. Nixon entered into 
office in January 1969, when the prospect of an endless attritional struggle had become 
so unappetizing that the big-unit war was discarded in favor of a “third act” to be 
based on leaving the fight almost entirely in the hands of the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN). This “Vietnamization” worked reasonably well—so long as Ameri-
can advisors remained and air power was available to 
provide close support.17 With this assistance, the ARVN 
defeated the 1972 “Easter Offensive”—although it 
was clear that American advisors and air power were 
essential to continued survival of the Saigon regime.18 Unfortunately, the design failed 
when, in the wake Watergate, which forced Nixon to resign from office in August 1974, 
his successor Gerald Ford found it politically impossible to continue to support South 
Vietnam. Eight months later Saigon fell. 
Such an ignominious ending led many—including one of the American War’s architects, 
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara—to conclude that the war was unwinnable and 
should not have been waged. The final assessment by McNamara is particularly vexing, 
as he saw that Washington
“failed to adhere to the fundamental principle that, in the final analysis, if the 
South Vietnamese were to be saved, they had to win the war themselves.”19 
MCNAMARA CONCLUDED THAT 
THE WAR WAS “UNWINNABLE”
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This seems quite an odd conclusion, given that the United States pursued a strategy 
throughout the Cold War based on helping those who were weaker to stand up to 
communist aggression. Certainly the Republic of Korea had not been expected to expel 
invaders from the North on its own. And the massive U.S. commitment of forces to Eu-
rope made clear that even these advanced countries—some of whom possessed nuclear 
weapons—were not to be compelled to fight and win on their own against the forces of 
the Warsaw Pact. Thus it is hard to see why the Republic of Vietnam was to be held en-
tirely responsible for its own defense against the larger population of the North—and 
the roughly five million South Vietnamese aligned with Hanoi—along with the North’s 
greater armed might, which was heavily augmented by Russian and Chinese aid. 
Indeed, there is an opposing school of thought to McNamara’s that rose up, one that 
has critiqued the warfare design pursued and offered alternatives. Most of its adherents 
show keen awareness of the fundamental problems posed by the challenge from the 
North: 1) Dealing with the Ho Chi Minh Trail; 2) Curtailing foreign aid to Hanoi; and 
3) Seizing the initiative from the enemy at the tactical level. Each of these objectives, in 
the end, turned out to lie beyond American capacities—at least in terms of the various 
methods employed to deal with them. But two of these three challenges could have 
been mastered. Russian aid could have been curtailed by being willing to take some 
risk of escalation. The tactical initiative could have been seized and sustained by using 
existing sensing technology more creatively.   
Disrupting the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the thorniest problem—most likely an insoluble 
one. For years the Trail was hit hard from the air, and continually raided and mined by 
Green Beret-led indigenous forces. Westmoreland was of a mind to hit it even harder, 
to the point of occupying a portion of the Trail to interdict the north-south flow of 
supplies. But the simple fact that the Trail was a network, not just a single path, raised 
the costs and risks of its interdiction precipitately. One detailed study Westmoreland 
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commissioned concluded that a “corps-sized force” (i.e., as many as 100,000 troops) 
was needed to block the Trail—including by crossing the border into Laos.20 
LBJ rejected this option, not only because of the inevitable rise in casualties such a 
move would entail, but due to concern that invasion of Laos might spark a major 
Chinese intervention. Some 300,000 Chinese troops served in North Vietnam during the 
war—though Beijing was careful about limiting them largely to manning anti-aircraft 
artillery batteries. An incursion into Laos might change this.21 Harry Summers, a retired 
colonel of infantry whose analysis of the war remains a Pentagon favorite, was less 
concerned about the costs and risks of the interdiction strategy. He believed failure to 
“seal off” the Trail was the “basic error” in American strategy, fed by the “myth” need-
ing to respect Laotian and Cambodian neutrality.22 However, another officer-turned-
analyst, Andrew Krepinevich, pointed out that the North Vietnamese could simply 
have mounted an “end run” beyond the point where any American line of interdiction 
stopped on its western end.23 
Given the operational difficulties and political risks involved in blocking the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail with ground troops, there was a considered attempt to solve the problem 
with technology—primarily unattended ground sensors. These were dropped by air 
by the tens of thousands, with many caught in high foliage, making them less useful. 
Sensors that made it to the ground were often spotted and exploited. One particular 
sensor was supposed to be a “people sniffer” focused on detecting excretions. NVA 
quickly learned to move them to unused portions of the Trail network, then hang bags 
of buffalo urine nearby, which “fetched the B-52s like flies.”24 It was a simple but very 
effective military deception. 
Despite the failure of this attempt, Westmoreland remained convinced that such an ap-
proach could work. Indeed, after his replacement in command in Vietnam by General 
Creighton Abrams, Westmoreland rose to become Army Chief of Staff and used this 
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bully pulpit to continue to advocate for technological solutions. He gave a particularly 
rousing speech on this theme to the Association of the United States Army in 1969:
On the battlefield of the future enemy forces will be located, tracked and 
targeted almost instantaneously … I see battlefields on which we can destroy 
anything we can locate.25   
Locating the enemy, of course, is a crucially important prerequisite for the success of any 
warfare design.  It was a condition never met in Vietnam—and remains a vexing one 
versus today’s insurgent and terrorist networks. Even today high technology alone can-
not locate the terrorist or insurgent often enough or reliably enough to achieve victory. 
As to the second great problem, curtailing foreign aid, since much of it came by sea—
road and rail links between North Vietnam and China were poor—the U.S. Navy 
had as early as 1964 been advocating mining 
the port of Haiphong, through which 85% of 
war material transited.26 Fears of bringing the 
communist superpowers into the war, and that 
escalation might nix peace talks, kept Johnson 
from acting. Nixon was more willing to act, but 
waited until 1972 to lay the mines, by which 
time he felt his diplomatic strategy had “suc-
ceeded in ‘detaching’ the USSR and China from 
their alliance with North Vietnam.”27 Imports 
soon decreased, bombing was stepped up, and 
by January 1973 an “agreement on ending the 




But the terms of the agreement allowed substantial NVA forces to remain on the 
ground in the South, and it was clear that Hanoi was already preparing for a final push 
against Saigon. Giap and his colleagues were betting that the U.S. military, particularly 
the Air Force, would not intervene yet again to thwart an offensive as they had in 1972. 
It was a good bet. Besides Nixon having been crippled politically by Watergate, the 
Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973 drew Washington’s attention—and U.S. arms 
shipments—away from Southeast Asia. And, at last, even stalwart American public 
support for continuing the containment strategy in Vietnam had faded. In part, this dis-
affection grew out of release of the so-called Pentagon Papers, which as George Herring 
has noted, “confirmed what critics of the war had long been arguing … that Kissinger 
and Johnson had consistently misled the public about their intentions in Vietnam.”28
If the peace agreement came too late, and the terms were too unfavorable, it was 
partly due to the inability to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and partly due to taking 
eight years to decide to mine the harbor at Haiphong. Nixon saw this latter action as 
having been crucial to success: “Our most telling operation was the mining of North 
Vietnam’s harbors … my only regret was that I had not done it earlier.”29 Indeed, this 
delay in taking action had grievous effects on the war effort; but it was failure to seize 
the initiative on the ground in the South—the third great war-fighting design chal-
lenge—that had allowed the conflict to drag on to a point beyond American willing-
ness to continue the struggle. 
And this third challenge is perhaps the most tragic, as the right formula—at least one 
that worked—had been identified early on: use of small American detachments in con-
junction with the ARVN and local militias. Green Berets were doing this from the outset 
of the war, and the Combined Action Program offered a viable prospect for expansion 
throughout the country. But Westmoreland chose to shift to a big-unit approach that 
he hoped would maximize the American advantage in mobility and firepower. What 
he was missing, of course, was an “information system” that could reliably locate the 
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LOCATING THE ENEMY–CRUCIAL TO 
SUCCESS–WAS NEVER CONSISTENTLY 
ACHIEVED IN VIETNAM
enemy and allow these advantages to come into play. That never happened. But it 
could have—and should have. 
How might the initiative have been seized in the South? In our view, the best descrip-
tion of how the fight could have been taken to the VC and NVA—by being in position 
to locate the enemy and start the firefights—can be found in the war memoir of a battal-
ion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert, U.S. Army. When he arrived in 
Vietnam in 1968, he was appalled to see how little effort was being made to locate the 
enemy—beyond the use of platoon-level patrols 
that “dangled the bait” in hopes of drawing the 
enemy into a fight that would then allow U.S. air 
and artillery support to join in to decisive effect. 
As mentioned above, the enemy soon learned to mount ambushes, inflict some losses, 
then break contact before massive firepower was brought to bear upon them. Herbert 
was told as well that the enemy “owned the night.” But he rejected this idea, advancing 
the notion that the Starlight night vision technology that every unit possessed created 
chances for taking the night away from the enemy.
Thus he began to send out small six-man teams to hunt for and locate VC and NVA, 
ambushing them or calling in other night-vision-enabled troops in his battalion to join 
in close combat against the enemy. In his own area of operations, Herbert was wildly 
successful. But he failed to spark enough interest among others at his level in trying 
out this concept of operations. And at higher levels of command, there was no interest 
whatsoever.30 In fact, there was much hostility to his views, and Herbert was relieved of 
his command in April 1969. His concept of operations was never adopted. So Anthony 
Herbert, much-decorated soldier from the Korean War who had risen from the ranks, 
whose battalion performed, by all measures, in an outstanding manner, was taken 
out of the fight and soon thereafter pushed into retirement. But his concept had great 
potential for allowing the initiative to be seized and, if paired with a continued CAP 
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Dean Rusk, Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara
system, could well have turned the tables on the VC and NVA—even if the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail were never interdicted, and a naval blockade never enacted. 
But, as matters stood, the Trail stayed open, supplies flowed from Russia and China by 
sea until 1972, and the enemy retained the initiative on the ground in the South until 
the end of the war. Clearly, the North’s design for the war was very resilient. Still, it is 
interesting to note that American designs included all the right pieces that could have 
led to victory. 
Conclusion
The Vietnam case provides what scholars of security studies would call a “tough test” 
of classical theories about war outcomes being determined by either sheer weight of 
weaponry or by more advanced technology. Per these measures, the United States, 
which enjoyed air and naval mastery and fielded massive, and massively armed, 
ground forces, should have been able to help the South preserve itself from conquest 
by the North. Failure to do so was surprising. Analysis of this failure, in our view, can 
be revelatory—especially when viewing the conflict through the lens of design. Seen 
in this way, the outcome of the 
war is not so puzzling. The 
North developed a simple, re-
silient design and stayed with 
it. The architects of the “Ameri-
can war,” on the other hand, 
went back and forth between 
design approaches, starting 
small and in a more advisory 
capacity, then shifting to a 
much more massive approach. 
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Then, at the very end, returning to the advisory role—with continuing air power—only 
to find that American public support for any persistent role in securing South Vietnam 
had finally withered. 
It is possible to blame Saigon for its own fall—as Robert McNamara did. But South 
Vietnam’s internal failings were made more serious by the large American presence 
and leadership of the war effort. As Frances FitzGerald once noted, “the vast Ameri-
can presence merely tore those feuding groups into smaller and smaller pieces.”31 Yet 
this view still rings hollow when weighed against the fact that the ARVN met and 
mastered the challenge posed by the North’s great Easter 
offensive of 1972. Vietnamization was able to work—with 
continued American air support. When this resource was 
withheld in 1975, the South was conquered. And why was 
the defensive design finally worked out not followed in 
the end? Because by 1975 the American people had had 
enough of Vietnam. It had taken too long to find and stick 
with a workable warfare design. For many years, over half 
the U.S. public had expressed a willingness to keep on 
supporting the existing war effort—or even to escalate it. 
But this level of support had finally collapsed. As Wil-
liam Colby, an intelligence officer in Vietnam who later 
became director of the CIA, summed it up, Americans 
“will sustain a major involvement over a short term, or a minor involvement over a 
longer term … What pragmatic Americans cannot support is a major involvement over 
a longer term where results cannot be shown.”32 
Westmoreland’s shift to a large-scale intervention, and his emphasis on “mobility plus 
firepower”—in the absence of an effective information system for locating the enemy—
meant that Colby’s worst-case would play out: large forces committed, for a long time, 
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with indeterminate results. Beyond this problem, there was the major effort associ-
ated with trying to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail that, as noted earlier, was actually 
a 90-mile-wide road network in rough country. And interdiction would, among other 
things, require violation of Laotian and Cambodian sovereignty. When this was done 
with regard to the latter country, North Vietnam responded by nurturing an insurgent 
group there, the Khmer Rouge, who ended up taking over Cambodia and launching 
one of history’s most grisly genocides. And the Trail stayed open. 
Instead of massive military intervention and a focus on interdicting supplies, it seems 
quite clear in retrospect—to use McNamara’s term, but with quite different inferences 
drawn—that the war effort could and should have been focused on fighting the VC and 
NVA on the ground in the South. This was certainly the goal of the Combined Action 
Program, a design highly praised by Marine General Walt who oversaw it—and even 
General Westmoreland grudgingly acknowledged CAP’s effectiveness. To complement 
CAP’s defensive orientation, Anthony Herbert’s concept of operations for taking the 
tactical offensive by exploiting the American technological edge in night-vision capabil-
ity should have been adopted. The results of his battalion’s efforts using the concept 
were outstanding. Sadly, Herbert’s influence was undermined by his ramrod-straight 
insistence on reporting others’ violations of the laws of war—much that was wrong 
went on, far beyond My Lai, and Herbert’s “outing” of war crimes at An Khe, Cu hoi, 
and elsewhere—played more than a small role in his being relieved of command.33
But in the end, we must circle back to Vo Nguyen Giap. The war was not won simply by 
American mistakes. No war is waged error-free, and Giap made his own share of mistakes 
that sometimes led to very costly tactical defeats. Yet his warfare design—for dealing with 
American air power, for keeping his forces supplied, and for holding the initiative with 
regard to when and where to engage the enemy—survived his own errors and did the most 
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IV. Some Insights into Conflict and Design
our goal in this Monograph has been to introduce a fresh 
perspective on military and security affairs, one that challenges common notions about 
warfare design. For the idea that sheer weight of numbers or more advanced weapons 
are sufficient for victory has been disproved many times over throughout history—and 
reaffirmed, alarmingly, in our own lifetimes. So, too, does history disprove the argu-
ment at the other end of the spectrum, that time and chance determine war outcomes 
and make conflict, as Clausewitz put it, “a game of cards.”1 There are indeed patterns 
that emerge. But these patterns are subtle and nuanced. With regard to numbers, the 
question is not How many are they? but rather How are they structured? Not How 
advanced are the weapons? But How well are they aligned with 
the forces and their various concepts of operations? The key to 
understanding warfare design is that it is an enduring quest 
to search for alternative designs, to choose from among them 
those that offer improvements—whether esthetically, structur-
ally, or functionally. And the designer is one who is willing to look at the heavens them-
selves with a probing eye. Alfonso the Wise, the king of Castile for almost sixty years in 
the 13th Century—a time of strife and great challenges in every direction—revealed his 
designer’s temperament when he said, “Had I been present at the creation of the world, 
I would have proposed some improvements.” The designer is always seeking. In ways 
of war, what is sought by the designer is not so much the big battalions, but rather the 
better battalions. Or perhaps a structure not based on battalions at all. Design in mili-
tary affairs also extends to searching out the fighting doctrine that best aligns with the 
structure of the forces, the weapons most suited to the tasks to be undertaken, and the 
informational dimensions of war. 
Is it possible to distill from the various historical cases that we have explored some 
broad, basic principles that apply in a general way to the design for war-fighting? We 




believe so. Perhaps the most catalyzing one has to do with the need to explore alterna-
tives that may deviate sharply from standard or traditional practices. The Roman and 
Byzantine cases make this point compellingly—and contrastingly. At a time when both 
the Western and Eastern Empires were faced with extensive, hard-to-defend territorial 
“edges” and the massive rise of barbarian threats, the Romans remained quite mired 
in traditional, infantry-based legionary practices—with the slight change that they 
chose to discard body armor to increase mobility—that made them prey, in particular, 
to swift, far-ranging horse archers. The Byzantines, on the other hand, shifted from an 
infantry-based core to cavalry—which they then decided to armor, both man and horse. 
This created something of a medieval version of the modern panzer division, and 
enabled Byzantium to survive the fall of Rome by nearly a thousand years. 
The Byzantines also illustrated another design principle: the “power of alignment” of 
design factors. By this we mean that, as one key study of alignment puts it, a condition 
wherein “the relationship between parts becomes as important as the parts themselves.”2 
A good example of this is the optical telegraph network of the Byzantines, which only 
made a big difference on the battlefield because the information it transmitted was usable 
by commanders who possessed cavalry units structured for rapid response. Without the 
cavalry’s high degree of mobility, optical telegraph messages would simply have been 
passing the bad news of irretrievable catastrophes. At the same time, absent these rapid 
flows of information over great distances, Byzantine generals would simply not have 
known exactly where to send the cavalry, and would only learn of the threatened area 
later—in most cases too late to come to the defense of the imperiled city or sector. Taken 
together, however, the ability to move both information and field forces swiftly created 
an absolutely winning design for strategically defensive war-fighting.
Beyond the Byzantines, other successful war-fighting designs we have examined herein 
have also reflected a keen ability—on the part of some—to move well beyond standard 
practices, and to align the elements in their designs skillfully. For example, the Hussites 
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A SUCCESSFUL DESIGN FOR WAR ENTAILS A GREAT WILLINGNESS TO 
EMBRACE EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
completely overthrew a principal pillar of medieval military affairs: the armored 
knight. They did so not by re-enlivening the old infantry-dominant design—that would 
come centuries after the Hussites with the rise of the Spanish “battles of infantry” in 
the 16th Century—but rather by putting war on wheels, armoring their wagon-forts, 
and filling them with men armed with handguns. The Hussites also embraced light 
artillery that they could carry along with them, reflecting the point that a successful 
design for war entails a great willingness to embrace emerging technologies. Their case 
also highlights a key point about the importance of alignment, in this instance between 
“tools and practices.” Hussite battle doctrine was perfectly suited to the mobility of the 
wagon-forts and the kind of firepower they brought to bear. 
The technological and informational elements of warfare design are especially well 
highlighted in the more modern cases that we have explored. In the case of the Ger-
man naval challenge to Britain prior to the outbreak of World War I, the primary choice 
made was to imitate the structure of the Royal Navy by building a dreadnought-based 
battle fleet and taking the same approach to war at sea—for the most part—as the 
British did. That is, to seek out the choicest moment for a decisive, Trafalgar-like clash. 
In the end, the Germans prevailed tactically at the Battle of Jutland, but could not 
change the strategic situation in that the British blockade remained intact. Ironically, the 
relatively quite small investment the Germans made in U-boats paid off handsomely 
in a new version of the classic guerre de course that nearly brought Britain to its knees. 
Why didn’t the Kaiser, or his head of the navy, Admiral Tirpitz, emphasize submarines 
instead of surface battleships? From a design perspective, we suggest that U-boat de-
velopment was neglected due to poor alignment of the technological and informational 
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FIVE SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS 
SUMMARIZE THIS WORK IN 
WARFARE DESIGN THUS FAR
factors. At the time, there was no reliable way to detect a submerged vessel. This was 
a key factor that, had it been heeded could have led to a better-aligned High Sea Fleet 
whose war-winning chances would have been excellent.
Our analysis of Vietnam as a “design competition” provides insights from the perspec-
tives of the more technologically advanced combatant and the side that is striving to 
cope with its vulnerabilities in the face of such a foe. The key American design strength 
was in firepower, delivered from the air and from artillery bases; the major U.S. vulner-
ability was in the informational domain. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army 
did their best to remain hidden as much as possible, creating extensive underground 
facilities for their forces in the field. As to supplying them, the key was a marvel of 
design for war-fighting: the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The brilliance 
of the design was that it was not simply a trail, but rather 
a network of rough roads spanning a range almost ninety 
miles wide in many places, and some six hundred miles in 
length. There was no way that aerial bombardment alone 
was going to interdict enough supplies in transit to cripple 
the insurgency in the South; and efforts to block the Trail with occupying forces would 
have entailed high political risks (Laos’s and Cambodia’s borders would have to be 
crossed) and great military operational costs. In the end, a successful American design 
for war-fighting in Southeast Asia depended on optimizing the advantage in sheer 
firepower by improving in the informational dimension. And the only way to do this 
would have been to move to a doctrine like the one Anthony Herbert employed—em-
phasizing small units, stealth, and the U.S. edge in night-vision technology, rather than 
larger movements via noisy, vulnerable helicopters. 
While the technological, structural, and doctrinal factors come easily to mind when 
thinking about designs for war, it is all too easy to neglect the informational domain. 
And it has been especially interesting for us to see the important role that information 
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has played in designs for war throughout history. The communicative function is best 
displayed by the Byzantine optical telegraph. The matter of “sensing” was at the fore in 
Vietnam, where the enemy whose design emphasized hiddenness was able to prosper. 
This factor also played a role in its failure to be used to a sufficient degree in the Ger-
man case, when the ability of U-boats to remain undetected until they chose to attack 
would have had profound impact on the war’s outcome had there been more of them. 
With regard to our broader findings in this monograph, there are five simple proposi-
tions that summarize our work in warfare design thus far: 
•	 War is a design challenge that requires attention to four critical design elements: 
doctrine, unit structure, technology, and information. 
•	 Not only must these four elements be present in warfare designs, they also must 
fit together and be well aligned as a whole to increase the probability of victory. 
•	 The absence and/or the poor alignment of the four design elements are major 
factors in the failures of warfare designs. 
•	 Adversaries are subject to the same design exigencies in warfare. As we saw 
in the Vietnam case, not only did North Vietnam carefully attend to all four 
warfare design elements and their alignment, but its warfare design enabled it 
to turn its weaknesses into strengths. At the same time, the US was unable to 
capitalize on its warfare design strengths. Worse still, its strengths became its 
greatest weaknesses. 
•	 Thus, adversaries continually jockey with their opponents to shift weaknesses 
into strengths and transform threats into opportunities. Developing a competitive 
advantage against one’s adversaries is a large part of the art of warfare design. 
War is perhaps humankind’s most complex, vexing undertaking; and we know that 
there are other factors important to the success of warfare designs. Brief mention of a 
few of them signals there is much more to the larger design story than we have been 
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able to outline herein. We know, for example, that successful warfare designs also 
depend on people, their skills, motivations and morale. “The passion of the people,” 
presumably including the soldiery, forms a critical part of Clausewitz’s trinity of war. 
Soldier morale was a key part of the Roman Emperor Gratian’s decision to have the 
infantry shed their body armor—the legionaries loved the idea of marching lighter. Re-
ligious and early nationalist zeal led to the Hussites fighting harder than their Crusader 
opponents. With the Hussites, we also saw how religious zeal, used first to defeat the 
external enemy, could be suicidally turned inward. During the Vietnam War, it was the 
steadfastness of both the North’s people and their soldiers that endured—and finally 
triumphed. Beyond the cases considered in this monograph, there are many other 
very powerful affirmations of the importance of this “passion” factor as an element of 
design for war. Napoleon’s career of conquest was driven to a great extent by his being 
able to rely on the unflagging dedication of the “citizens” who filled the ranks of the 
Grande Armée by means of the levée en masse. And more than a millennium earlier, the 
Arab advances across vast stretches of the Middle East and North Africa were less the 
result of wise generalship or advanced weaponry and more the product of tremendous 
enthusiasm for the cause that belief in Islam generated and sustained. Thus, as one 
historian noted of this period—with a sly eye on the modern era—the Arabs 
“swept irresistibly forward without organization, without pay, without 
plans, and without orders. They constitute a perpetual warning to techni-
cally advanced nations who rely for their defence on scientific progress 
rather than the human spirit.”3 
Viewing a more recent conflict—the Russo-German war, 1941–1945, which featured the 
largest and bloodiest land campaign in all of human history—Alan Clark highlighted 
above all else the importance of soldiers in the design for war. As he put it, “[f]oremost 
must come the ordinary Russian soldier; abominably led, inadequately trained, poorly 
equipped, he changed the course of history by his courage and tenacity.”4 Though the 
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Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army were better led, trained, and equipped, their 
victory, too, was to a very great extent the product of courage and tenacity. Thus has it 
been many times in the sanguinary history of war. These soldierly virtues also hint at 
the larger question of how human factors play at another level, what we prefer to call 
“strategic design.” By this term we mean to encompass the broader factors of societal 
and institutional organization, international diplomacy and, to return to Clausewitz yet 
once more, the greater notion of high-level politico-strategic direction. Some would call 
this “grand strategy”; and it most certainly fits with Clausewitz’s famous formulation 
that war is but a “continuation of politics by other means.” 
Returning to the Vietnam case, we do not see it as a war of containment fought against 
totalitarian control over a quiescent populace. Rather, the Vietnamese people were 
clearly dedicated to the cause of seeing the expulsion of foreign forces and unification 
of the country. This fierce spirit was hearkened to by the Hanoi leadership in references 
going back many centuries, to the successful resistance mounted against Mongol and 
Chinese invaders. Giap the history teacher was keen on this point, quick to describe the 
conflict in terms of “people’s war, people’s victory.”5 Thus it is these “other means” that 
form a significant part of what we intend to explore next, using the concept of strategic 
design as our guide. 
For now, though, it is more than enough, we believe, to have highlighted the value 
of thinking about military and security affairs through the lens of design. We hope to 
have made a persuasive case that a perspective cultivated in this manner can add most 
THERE ARE MANY POWERFUL AFFIRMATIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF 
“PASSION OF THE PEOPLE” AS AN ELEMENT OF DESIGN FOR WAR
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usefully to classic notions of war outcomes as driven simply by numerical or techno-
logical superiority. All too many conflicts—well beyond those we have considered 
herein—are able to offer contradictory evidence to undermine the conventional wisdom 
about war. And all confirm the importance of considering war as, above all else, a design 
challenge. 
And at the broad level of strategic design, we close by noting that the “design for 
peace” should come very much to the fore as well. Peace by means of the heavy arma-
ments that deter; by means of diplomacy able to soothe antagonisms that feed war talk; 
but above all else by means of believing that peace must be approached as a serious 
design challenge. K.K. Casey, a director of the DuPont Corporation, when testifying 
before the Nye-Vandenberg Committee over five years prior to the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, noted the high importance of taking a strategic approach to peacetime 
when he said, “Wars frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired.”
In our view, this gives something of an edge to those who think in terms of designing 
for peace. And to those whose duties require them to craft designs for war, we note that 
this task too may, if undertaken skillfully enough, serve to keep and sustain peace—the 
ultimate goal of design. 
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